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Abstract 
The primary objective of  this study is to examine the association between board composition, the existence of 
audit committees, ownership structure and the level of  voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of  listed 
companies in Bahrain Stock Exchange.   Information was generated  using content analysis of annual reports. A 
disclosure check list consisting of thirty items were identified from previous research and a self-constructed 
voluntary disclosure index was developed.  Descriptive statistics, correlations  and regression analysis were used 
to test the research hypotheses.  Contrary to expectations and consistent with some previous empirical studies, 
the results indicate that there is no relationship between the extent of  voluntarily disclosure and both, board 
composition and audit committees, but there is a negative and weak relationship with ownership concentration. 
The paper  concludes that further explanation of  why companies voluntarily disclose information is still needed.   
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure index; Board composition; Audi Committee; Ownership structure; Bahrain. 
 
1. Introduction 
Mandatory disclosure rules ensure equal access to basic information (Lev 1992), but this information has to be 
augmented by firm’s voluntary disclosures and information production by intermediaries (Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006).  There are major market incentives to disclose information voluntarily and managers’ attitudes to 
disclosure change according to the perceived relationship of the costs and benefits involved (Gray et al., 1990 
and Healy and Palepu, 1995).   By increasing the level of disclosure to the users, companies can lower their 
capital costs, gain investor confidence and improve the marketability of shares (Meek et al., 1995; Kristandl and 
Bontis, 2007; and Apostolos and Konstantinos, 2009).  According to Ho and Wong (2001) the Asian financial 
crisis in the late 1990 not only resulted from a loss of investor confidence but also from a lack of effective 
corporate governance and transparency in many of Asian financial markets and individual firms.  Apostolos and 
Konstantinos  (2009) state that  "poor corporate governance is one of the main causes of financial crises.  
Most of the world crises is because of  the lack of sound corporate governance and honest executives".   
Good corporate governance should strengthen the internal control procedures of the corporation and ensure 
timely, accurate, and comprehensive disclosure of all material matters including financial condition, performance, 
ownership and governance of corporation.   
The accounting literature sheds some light on the association between the level of voluntary disclosure and board 
composition, audit committees and ownership  structure.   However, previous empirical studies on this issue 
yield mixed  results.  For example, Adams and Hossain (1998), Chen and Jaggi (2000), Li et al. (2008) and 
Gisbert and Navallas (2013) found significant positive association between voluntary disclosure and the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board.  Similarly,  Al-Janadi et al. (2013) examined the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia.  They found that non-
executive directors, board size, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality have a significant contribution in 
providing quality voluntary disclosure.  Ling and Chai (2012) results indicate that firms with concentrated 
ownership structure have higher extent of voluntary disclosure.  
On the other hand, Haniffa and Cooke (2002),  Eng and Mak (2003), Gul and Leung (2004) and Barako et al. 
(2006) found a negative relationship.  Moreover, Ho and Wong (2001), Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Wan 
Mohamad (2010) did not find a significant relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure.  
Nasir and Abdullah (2001) did not find any association between the existence of an audit committee and 
voluntary disclosure and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) found no evidence that ownership structure is related to 
voluntary disclosure.    
The main purpose of this study is to provide  answers to the following two questions. 
1. What information do  listed companies in Bahrain voluntarily              
           disclose in their annual reports? 
2. Is  the level of  voluntary disclosure associated with board composition, the existence of an audit 
committee and ownership structure? 
The motivation for this study stems from the importance of information disclosure as one of the important 
aspects of good corporate governance.  Disclosing information is necessary since  investors  mainly rely on the 
information disclosed in the annual reports and voluntary information disclosure will enhance transparency, 
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signals the performance of the corporation, clarifies the conflict of interest between the shareholders and the 
management and reduces opportunistic behavior and information asymmetry (Tian and Chen, 2008 and 
Verrecchia, 2001).   
Most developing countries, and Bahrain is not an exception, do not have strong policy on voluntary disclosure.  
Therefore, this study fills up the gap by examining the association between corporate governance mechanisms 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports.    In addition, previous research examines the impact 
of corporate governance mechanisms on the level of voluntary disclosure in USA, Europe and Asia.   There has 
been limited published rigorous research on corporate governance in the Gulf region in general and in Bahrain in 
particular where differences in corporate governance codes and ownership structure lead to differences in agency 
relations, and as a result, in the role of independent directors and voluntary disclosure.   
The paper is organized  as follows. The next section provides a  review of previous research on the level of  
voluntary disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms. Subsequent data and methodological considerations 
are followed by analytical results distilled from the firms’ annual reports.  The last section summarizes the results, 
draws conclusions in light of the study’s limitations and suggests recommendations and areas for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Board composition, size and duality of leadership  
The constituents of the board are important as they are charged with the management on behalf of the absentee 
owners and they effectively monitor managers' performance and reduce agency costs.  Agency theory argues that 
in order to protect the shareholders' interests, the board need to be effective.    The effectiveness of the board is 
influenced by board composition and quality, size, duality of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and chairman 
position, board diversity, and board culture (Brennan, 2006).  
One of the most significant governance issues currently faced by corporations is board composition (Milliken 
and Martins, 1996).  It refers to the proportion of outside directors to the total number of directors  (Shamsher 
and Annuar (1993).   There are two main categories of directors: executive and non-executive independent 
directors. A non-executive director is a director  who is  not involved in the  day to day  operations and 
management of  the business.  Although  the executive directors have specialized skills, expertise on the firm's 
activities and  valuable knowledge of the firm's operating policies, independent non-executive directors are 
needed on the board in monitoring as well as controlling the actions of the opportunistic executive directors 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   Outside directors thus act as the check and balance mechanism in enhancing 
boards’ effectiveness and  play a significant role in company's monitoring system (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
They contribute to the new ideas, independence, objectivity,  provide advice in strategic decisions and  act as a 
powerful tool for constraining managers' behavior (Weir, 2003 and Clemente and Labat, 2009).   This is largely 
attributed to their expertise and being independent of  management (Rosentein and Wyatt, 1990).  Both the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act and the relevant stock market rules on corporate governance assume that non-executive 
directors are more effective in monitoring management (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). 
Higher level of board independence would lead to improved transparency and responsibility by means of  more 
voluntary disclosure under the principle of accountability to the company and shareholders for any decision and 
its consequences. This suggests a higher and stronger monitoring and controlling role of independent directors 
(Williamson, 1984; and  Hussain, 2009).  Non-executive directors would enhance the monitoring of the quality 
of firm disclosures and would reduce the benefits from withholding information (Forker, 1992).  This will 
improve disclosure quality in financial statements and therefore, reduces the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors through greater information transparency.  Therefore,  firms whose boards are dominated 
by independent directors are expected to disclose more information and  have less likelihood of accounting fraud 
and  earnings management (see: Leftwich et al., 1981; Beasley, 1996; Peasnell et al., 2000; Adams and Hussain, 
1998; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Klien, 2002; and Leung and Horwitz, 2004).    
The relevant role of non-executive directors in the governance process has led most corporate governance codes 
to recommend the presence of  a majority of  independent directors on the board. Weir and Laing (2003) and 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) found  that boards dominated by a higher proportion of independent directors 
have significantly positive association with the level of voluntary  disclosure  (see also Nasir and Abdullah, 2001; 
Lim et al., 2007;  Huafang and Jianguo,  2007;  Clemente and Labat, 2009;  and Yuen et al., 2009).  However, 
non-executive directors are also argued to play limited role, as advisors than active decision makers (Mace, 
1971).  As such, Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004 and Barako et al., 2006 found a negative relationship 
between independent directors and the level of voluntary disclosure.   
Size of  the board (i.e., number of  board members) may affect the extent of voluntary disclosure.  Florackis and 
Ozkan (2004) and Cheng (2008) argue that boards with more than seven or eight members are unlikely to be 
effective.  Larger board size results in less effective coordination, communication and decision making.   In 
addition, the agency problems associated with larger boards are higher than smaller ones.  In this regard, Byard 
and Weintrop (2006) found that financial disclosure decreases with board size.  Thus, the smaller the board is, 
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the higher the disclosure score of  corporate information. 
Finally, agency theory assumes that role duality (i.e., Chairman is also  Chief Executive Officer-CEO) reduces 
the ability of directors to monitor CEO which increases agency problems that affect board independence 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).   Thus, the independence of the board by separate leadership   is necessary so that the 
board will be able to put pressure on the CEO and management in disclosing more information, about the 
company, which is in line with the interests of the shareholders.  Ho and Wong (2001) and Gul and Leung (2004), 
Lakhal (2005) and Byard and Weintrop (2006) found a significant relationship between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and separation between Chairman and CEO. 
2.2 Audit Committee 
Financial problems experienced by certain companies in recent years highlighted the shortcomings in the work 
of internal audit department. This underlined the urgent need for boards of directors to play a bigger role in 
enhancing control   and monitoring of their companies through an independent audit committee.  The audit 
committee is a standing sub-committee of  the  board and tends to consist of a minimum of  three non-executive 
directors enjoying neutrality and independence.   The Bahraini code of corporate governance states that the audit 
committee shall meet four times a year and have at least three members and a majority of the members including 
the chairman shall be independent non-executive directors.  The Sarbanes Oxley Act of (2002) requires firms to 
maintain audit committees whose members are all independent directors and at least one of them with financial 
expertise.  Similarly, executive directors are not allowed to be members of the audit committee in the UK. 
Boards of directors are increasingly delegating responsibility for financial reporting  to the audit  committee.  As 
such, the primary purpose of the audit committee is to ensure the quality of the financial reporting process and 
monitor the application of the rules and regulations governing financial and non-financial activities.  The 
committee is also responsible for the activities of  the internal audit department and has responsibility for the 
appointment of company's auditors and agreeing their remuneration, oversees a company’s audit process and 
internal accounting controls and ensure auditors observe independence requirements in the preparation of annual 
reports (Hussain, 2009).    
The accounting scandals  and corporate bankruptcies around the world have raised questions about an audit 
committee’s actual effectiveness in constraining earnings management (Klien 2002).  Therefore, composition 
and operational characteristics of audit committees  are viewed as important  characteristic of the audit 
committee effectiveness.  Five characteristics have been proposed: independence, expertise, assiduousness, 
external commitment of  audit committee members, and senior executive director presence on the audit 
committee.  A major characteristic of the audit committee effectiveness is its independence (Klien, 2002).  Thus, 
the committee shall have the resources and authority necessary for its duties and responsibilities without seeking 
the approval of the board or management.     Nevertheless, the fact that the audit committee is a sub-committee 
of  the board could hinder its effectiveness as it cannot bypass the board.  Al Ajmi (2009) found that auditor 
independence is considered by clients as one of the prerequisites for a good-quality audit because  non-audit 
services were found to affect auditor independence and hence impair audit quality.  He also found that credit and 
financial analysts perceive bigger auditing firms to be more independent of  the management of  their clients.  
This will result in more pressure to reduce the amount of information withheld (Bradbury, 1992).    
The existence of an audit committee enhances quality report, increases disclosure quality, improves the internal 
control system and,  as a result, more reliable financial reporting (Collier, 1993; Forker, 1992; McMullen, 1996 
and Ho and Wong, 2001).  Moreover, Barako et al. (2006) and Yuen et al. (2009) found that the presence of an 
audit committee has a positive and significant association with the level of voluntary disclosure.  
2.3 Ownership structure 
The firm’s ownership structure is associated with different levels of disclosure (Gelb, 2000).  Information  is 
expected to increase with higher levels of ownership diffusion where non-controlling shareholders cannot be 
easily constrained by majority shareholders to acquire a greater level of transparency and information disclosure 
(Raffournier, 1995).  The number of shareholders is a measure of dispersion of shareholder control.  An increase 
in number of shareholders results in a decrease in the number of shareholders with a block ownership.  As the 
number of shareholders increases, one would expect disclosure to increase if it can provide a solution to the 
additional monitoring problems associated with dispersion in ownership.  Monitoring problems that could be 
solved by issuing public accounting reports would increase with the increase in number of owners (Schipper, 
1981).    
Agency theory underlies that widely held firms are more likely to disclose information due to the effort of 
managers to prove that they do not act self-centered.  Thus, companies with wide share diffusion are expected to 
present a higher level of disclosure.    As per the Bahraini code, a substantial shareholder (or block holder 
ownership) is one who  holds 5% or more  of common stock issued by the company.  The decrease in number of  
block holder ownership is expected to increase the level of voluntary disclosure (Petilli and Prencipe, 2007).  
Therefore, companies with a larger number of shareholders are more likely to provide additional information to 
satisfy the information needs of diverse shareholders.  
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Gray (1988) argues that where a firm’s shares are closely held, there is a preference for confidentiality so that 
disclosure is restricted to those who are closely involved with the management and financing of  the firm.  This 
indicates that controlling owners are likely to be less dependent on transparency  in information disclosure and 
they can obtain information directly from informal channels.  Hence, a company with centralized ownership 
structure will be reluctant to disclose additional information. 
On the other hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that when there is a diffusion in ownership, the potential for 
conflicts between the principal and the agent is greater.  It is also argued that agency problems can be mitigated 
through the involvement of large shareholders in monitoring or controlling activities that potentially lead to these 
problems (Noe, 2002).   Large shareholders are expected to have greater incentives to monitor management as 
their wealth is tied to the performance of the firm.   Therefore, outside block holders are predicted to demand 
more information to be disclosed in the annual reports to reduce information asymmetry among the small 
shareholders. In this regard, Malone et al.,  (1993); Cooke, (1989), Nasir and Abdullah, (2001) and Haniffa and 
Cooke, (2002), Chau and Gray (2002)  and Ho et al. (2013) found a significant and positive association between 
the ownership diffusion  and the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports.   
Additionally, a number of previous empirical studies report a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure (Yuen et al,, 2009; Barako et al., 2007; Chang and Courtenay, 2006; Chen 
and Jaggi, 2000; Chau and Gray, 2002; and Hossain et al. (1994)).  Moreover, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) 
found that higher block-holder ownership is associated with increased disclosure.   In addition, Haniffa and 
Cooke (2007), Donnelly and Malcahy (2007) and Eng and Mak (2003) did not find evidence on a significant 
relationship between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure.  Finally, Clemente and Labat (2009) suggest 
that minority shareholders represented by independent directors are the ones requiring and demanding higher 
levels of voluntary information disclosure.  However, they  found that ownership concentration does not affect 
the level of information that listed companies disclose in their annual reports.   
In summary, previous empirical studies  show contradicting results regarding the association between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms,  particularly with the significant role of board 
composition and audit committees.  Figure 1 below shows the framework of  the study.   
Figure 1: Framework of study 
 
2.4 Research Hypotheses 
Based on the aforementioned  review of  the literature, the following research hypotheses can be developed. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between board size and the proportion of independent  non-executive 
directors on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
H2: There is a negative  relationship between the Chairman duality of leadership (CEO) and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure.  
H3: There is a  positive relationship  between audit committee size and independence and the extent of 
voluntarily disclosure. 
H4: There is a positive relationship between diffused ownership of shares  and the extent of voluntarily 
disclosure.  
 
3. Research Method 
The population surveyed in the study consists of all listed companies  operating in Bahrain. All companies were 
selected for the study, a total of  (48) companies as per Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) in   February  2013.  The 
breakdown of  the sample companies is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Companies traded on the BSE 
No. Company type No. % 
1. Commercial banks 7 14.6 
2. Investment sector 14 29.2 
3. Insurance sector 6 12.5 
4. Services sector 8 16.7 
5. Industrial sector 2 4.2 
6. Hotels and tourism sector 6 12.5 
7. Overseas companies 5 10.3 
 Totals 48 100.0 
A motivation for choosing listed companies is that the agency theory  problems in small closely-held companies 
may be less severe between owners and  managers but more severe between controlling managers and absentee 
owners.  The information was generated from the latest annual reports of  the companies (2013 reports),  which  
were obtained through their websites on the internet.   Annual reports are a highly useful source of data as 
managers commonly signal what is important through the reporting mechanism.  Guthrie and Petty (2000) view 
them as a communication tool that allows a corporation to connect to various stakeholders.   
The reports were subject to content analysis which is potentially one of the most important research techniques 
in the social sciences (Kripendorff, 2004).  Each report was examined in all its details to ensure that firms were 
not penalized for non-disclosure of  irrelevant items (see Cooke, 1989 and 1992).  Special attention was given to 
the Board of directors report to shareholders, chairman’s statement, CEO statement/message and auditor’s report. 
The information generated cover the  board composition (i.e., size of  the board, proportion of  independent 
directors and concentration of CEO and chairman),  the size and composition of audit committee and degree of 
ownership structure.   In addition to the annual reports, phone calls were made with the managing directors of 
some companies to clarify certain ambiguities.   
To provide initial insights into voluntary disclosure, descriptive statistics were initially employed. Pearson 
correlation and multiple regression were then used to test the hypotheses.   Correlation among variables was 
tested at the .05 level of significance. 
3.2 The measurement of variables 
3.2.1  The dependent variable - The voluntary disclosure index (VDI) 
The annual reports of the firms selected for the study are checked against a self-constructed voluntary disclosure 
index  based on Meek et al. (1995), Chau and Gray (2002) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006).  The final 
disclosure checklist consists of four major categories; company profile, board structure and board committees; 
employee related issues; and stakeholders interests.     Under each category, there are certain disclosure items.  
The checklist  is developed based on relevant disclosure requirements of  Bahraini companies, relevant literature 
and with reference to the several important corporate governance principles and recommendations of  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  Only items of information not required by 
law or accounting standards are included.    A total of  (30) items are used in the final list and the voluntary 
disclosure index is based on this  checklist.  
A commonly used method in developing disclosure indices is simple dichotomous score  where each disclosure 
item is given a score of  1 if  it is reported or 0 if  it is. Inapplicable items to all companies such as environment 
protection were  excluded.  This approach was used by previous studies but the  limitation of  it is that it does not 
reflect the relative importance of each item and assumes that all items have the same weight and informational 
interest for users (e.g., Cormier and Magnan, 2000;  Clemente and Labat, 2009 and Matoussi and Chakroun, 
2005).   There has been no attempt to assess the information needs of users and all items were weighted equally, 
assuming that each has the same information content to the users.  This choice may or may not affect the 
measured index (see Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003 and Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987).  The reason why 
dichotomous scores were used is that the data were collected through careful examination of the annual reports 
of the companies, rather than asking respondents to rate the relative importance of each disclosure item.  The 
voluntary disclosure index for each company was computed by dividing the total amount of actual scores given 
for disclosure items by the total number of disclosure items.  The maximum score was 0.77.  Two   levels of 
voluntary disclosure were used in the study.  High if  it is 0.5 or more and low if  it is  less than 0.5. 
3.2.2 The independent variables 
1. Board size (BS) and composition (BC).  Special reference was given to the number of board members, the 
proportion of  independent non-executive directors in relation to the total number of directors on the board 
and duality of leadership, i.e., CEO is also Chairman of the board (DUAL).   
2. Audit committee.  Special attention was given to the size (ACS) (i.e., the number of audit committee members) 
and the number of  independent members on the committee (IMAC). 
3. Ownership  structure  (OWN). Ownership could be by state, and state-related institutions, managerial 
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ownership and individual ownership.  The study focuses on individual ownership; government ownership is 
excluded.    Ownership  is measured  by the number of shareholders holding the total number  of shares 
issued and outstanding.  Block holder is a shareholder who owns 5% or more of total number of shares issued.    
It is divided into two groups of shareholders: those who hold less than 5% and those with block ownership 
holding 5% or more.   
3.2.3 Regression model 
Based on the above definition of dependent and independent variables, the regression model for this study is 
VDI=β0+β1BS+β2IMB+β3DUAL+β4ACS+β5IMAC+β6OWN 
Where, 
b  = Coefficient of each independent variable 
VDI = Voluntary disclosure index 
BS   = Board size in terms of the number of directors on the board 
IMB = The number of  independent non-executive directors on the board 
DUAL=Duality of leadership, i.e. Chairman is also CEO 
ACS = The number of audit committee members 
IMAC=The number of independent directors in audit committee 
OWN=The number of shareholders holding 5% or more of company shares   
3.2.4 Reliability test of voluntary disclosure scores 
The disclosure domains together with their items were tested for internal consistency.   One of the most 
commonly used measures of reliability is Cronbach’s  alpha (Coakes, 2005).  The value of  Cronbach’s alpha 
ranges between 0 and 1, whereby value closer to 1 implies higher internal consistency reliability (Sekaran, 2003 
and Sekaran and Bougie, 2010).  The reliability test results show that the Cronbach’s alpha value is  0.63 for the 
four dimensions  in the voluntary disclosure score, suggesting that the data in the study may not be subjected to 
random measurement error which could reduce the power of  the empirical tests in the study (Gul and Leong, 
2004). 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Voluntary disclosure index 
Table 2 shows statistics for the voluntary disclosure index for the (48) companies. The overall mean index is 
(0.48) suggesting that, on average, the sample companies disclose (14.4) of  the (30)  items comprising the 
general index.  This value is higher than the results reported in other studies Lim et al. (2007) and Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) who scored an average index of .18 and .14 respectively and for a mean disclosure index of 
0.25 by Clemente and Labat (2009).  It appears that the highest disclosed items are  company's products or 
services, general corporate information and management analysis. The lowest disclosed items are: appointment 
of directors, assessment of board members, amount spent on training and company human resource policy.  
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Table 2. Checklist of voluntary disclosure items 
No. Disclosure items No. % 
 A. Company profile   
1. General corporate information 43 89.6 
2. Management analysis 39 81.3 
3. Organization structure 24 50.0 
4. Corporate strategy& future prospects 29 60.4 
5. Market share 24 50.0 
6. Review of operations 28 58.3 
7. Products/services/activities 45 93.8 
8. Segmental information 41 85.4 
 B. Board structure and committees   
9. Qualifications of each director 28 58.3 
10. Frequency of board meetings 23 47.9 
11. Roles and responsibilities of  the board 29 60.4 
12. Remuneration of directors 30 62.5 
13. Board committees 36 75.0 
14. Roles and responsibilities of committees 21 43.8 
15. Interests of directors in shares 21 43.8 
16. Number of each committee meetings 21 43.8 
17. Independence of committee members 15 31.3 
18. Reports on committees’ work 11 22.9 
19. Names and number of board committee members 11 22.9 
20. Appointment of directors   4   8.3 
21. Assessment of board members   8 16.7 
22. Attendance of committee meetings 37 77.1 
23. Related party transactions 16 33.3 
24. Risk management 31 64.6 
 C. Employee related issues   
25. Employees training and development 15 31.3 
26. Amount spent on training   0   0 
27. Amount of employees’ benefits 21 43.8 
 D. Stakeholders interests   
28. Contribution to community 22 45.8 
29. Company human resource policy   2 4.2 
30. Relationships with customers, creditors & investors 16 33.3 
           Overall mean                                                                          48.0 
4.2 Descriptive statistics of  independent variables 
Hussain and Millan (2002) analyze the existing state of corporate governance in Bahrain through a 
questionnaire survey addressed to listed companies.  They found that some companies have independent boards 
of directors and separate roles of chairman and CEO.  It was not clear how effective the nominations process is 
and directors tend to be entrenched.  They also found that the majority of companies have internal audit 
department and risk management control. This was before the issuance of the code of corporate governance in 
Bahrain in 2010.  Further progress has been made with the issuance  of  the code which was applied beginning 
of (2011). 
The Bahraini code of corporate governance specifies the size, roles and responsibilities of directors and ensures 
independence of board members.  It recommends that at least one-half of company's board should be non-
executives and at least three of these persons should be independent.  The code also requires that the board 
should form a nominations committee of at least three members which shall identify persons qualified to become 
members of  the board.  This is in addition to the condition  that the Chairman should not be the CEO. 
Tables 3 shows summary statistics of the study variables. It shows that the majority of  firms have independent 
directors on the board.    In thirty seven companies (90%) the Chairman of the board is not CEO.  Table 4 
shows that the mean value is 1.97 which indicates that a majority of companies have separate leadership 
structure although the minimum value shows that there are few companies which have combined leadership 
structure (4 companies).  Gul and Leung (2004) results reveal that external directors with wide professional 
expertise act as an important control mechanism in companies where chairman and CEO responsibilities rely on 
the same person.  Thirty six firms have audit committees with a size between 3-4 members. As per the code, the 
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members of the audit committee consist of both independent and dependent directors.  Table 3  also shows 
ownership structure with majority of shareholders are block holders. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of independent variables 
 A. Number of independent directors    F % 
1. One     4 10.0 
2. Two   2   5.0 
3. Three   8 20.0 
4. Four   7 17.5 
5. Five or more 19 47.5 
 Totals 40 100.0 
 B. Duality of leadership (i.e., CEO is Chairman)  F % 
1. Yes   4     9.8 
2. No 37   90.2 
 Totals 41 100.0 
 C. Number of audit committee members   F % 
1. Two   1   2.7 
2. Three 19 51.4 
3. More than three 17 45.9 
 Totals 37 100.0 
 D. Number of independent members on audit committee    F % 
1. One    7 19.0 
2. Two   5 13.5 
3. Three  25 67.5 
 Totals 37 100.0 
 E. Ownership structure*   F % 
1. Less than 1%  35 73 
2. 1% - less than 5% 35 73 
3. 5% - Less than 10% 25 52 
4. 10% - less than 20% 27 56 
5. 20% - less than 50% 12 25 
6. 50% and above 11 23 
*Multiple responses were allowed 
4.3 Board Size and Independence 
Table 4 shows that the board has a mean size of (8) ranging from a minimum of  5 to a maximum of 15.  This 
may be considered as a reasonable board size.  Effective number of board size should not be more than 7 or 8 
members to avoid less effective coordination, communication and decision making (Florackis and Ozkan 2004).  
Small board size could  lead to more participation by board members which would result in a positive impact on 
the monitoring function and decision making capability of the board.    
Table 4 also shows that the number of  independent directors ranges between 1 and 6 members with a mean of 
(4.2).  Board independence and size are closely related as the larger the board the larger to be the number of 
independent directors (Matolcsy et al., 2004; Denis and Sarin, 1999 and Lim et al. 2007).   
Table 4. Summary statistics of the variables 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum SD    N 
a. Disclosure index  0.50 0 1 0.505 48 
b. Number of  board members 8.25 5 12 2.158 48 
c. Number of independent directors     4.2 1 6 1.667   40 
d. Duality of  leadership   1.97 1 2 0.300   41 
e. Audit committee size  2.38       2        4 0.644   37 
f. Independent members in AC    2.5       1        3 1.290   36 
g. Block ownership  1.42       1        2 .498   48 
4.4  Correlation matrix analysis 
Table 5 shows the correlation between the variables.  There is no significant relationship, at the .05 level, 
between disclosure index and board size,  number of independent directors and block ownership.  Board size and 
number of independent directors have a significant relationship, indicating that more members on the board 
result on more independent directors.  The code of corporate governance in Bahrain recommends that board size 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                 www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.7, 2014 
 
132 
should not exceed 15 members.  Also audit committee size and number of independent members in the 
committee are negatively correlated at the .01 level implying that having more audit committee members will 
result in less independent members in the committee.  Independent members on audit committee are able to 
create pressure in disclosing more voluntary information.  However, this negative correlation may be related to 
the code of corporate governance in Bahrain.  The code recommends that audit committee members should be at 
least three and majority is independent members.  There is no mention of how many the independent members 
should be.  So, one may infer that one independent member with accounting and finance experience in the 
committee may be enough.  If all audit committee members are independent, the committee may not be able to 
have easy access to the accounting records.   
Table 5. Pearson correlation matrix of disclosure index and corporate governance mechanisms 
Variable Disclosure 
index 
Board 
size 
Independent 
directors 
Audit 
com. 
size 
Independent 
members 
Duality of 
leadership 
No of 
shareholders 
a.  Disclosure 
index 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .211 .220 .187 -.152 .040 .000
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
 
.075 .078 .103 .188 .401 .500
N 48 48 43 47 36 41 48
b. Board size Pearson 
Correlation 
.211 1 .241 .108 .033 .116 .027
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
.075
 
.059 .234 .423 .234 .426
N 48 48 43 47 36 41 48
c. Independent 
directors 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.220 .241 1 -.019 -.009 .121 .088
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
.078 .059
 
.451 .478 .231 .287
N 43 43 43 42 36 39 43
d. Audit com. 
size 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.187 .108 -.019 1 -.414
**
-.028 -.348
**
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
.103 .234 .451
 
.006 .431 .008
N 47 47 42 47 36 40 47
e. Independent 
members 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.152 .033 -.009 -.414
**
1 -.150 .075
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
.188 .423 .478 .006
 
.198 .333
N 36 36 36 36 36 34 36
f. Duality of 
leadership 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.040 .116 .121 -.028 -.150 1 .162
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
.401 .234 .231 .431 .198
 
.156
N 41 41 39 40 34 41 41
g. Number  of 
shareholders 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.000 .027 .088 -.348
**
.075 .162 1
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
.500 .426 .287 .008 .333 .156
 
N 48 48 43 47 36 41 48
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
4.5 Linear  regression results 
All variables were put into multiple regression to test their relationship with the dependent variable, voluntary 
disclosure index.  The results of the linear regression for voluntary disclosure are summarized under model 1 in 
Table 6 below.  The R is 0.307 while the adjusted R squared is 0.094.  This means that model 1 below is able to 
explain only 9 percent of the variance in the disclosure index.  None  of the variables shows a significant P value 
which states that there is no association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the independent variables.   
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Table 6. Multiple regression results of  the relationship between dependent and independent variables 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .183 .914  .200 .843 
Board size .005 .047 .020 .101 .921 
Indepedent directors .024 .068 .069 .356 .725 
Audit committee size -.067 .191 -.078 -.351 .728 
Independent members in 
audit committee  
-.066 .078 -.175 -.846 .405 
Duality of leadership .273 .317 .162 .864 .395 
Number  of shareholders .043 .062 .138 .696 .493 
 
Dependent Variable: disclosure index 
R = 0.307;  R = 0.094; Adjusted R squared=0.107 
4.6 Hypotheses  test 
Hypothesis 1 test:  
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) found a positive association between board size and proportion of independent 
directors on the board and voluntary disclosure.  This indicates a board's capability to influence managers to 
disclose more voluntary information.  Moreover, large boards are viewed as an effective governance mechanism 
to enhance transparency and disclosure.  The results in Tables 5 and 6 (Pearson correlation and multiple 
regression) between the dependent and independent variables show that there is no significant relationship at 
the .05 level between board size and the level of voluntary disclosure (.075).   John and Senbet (1998) advocate 
that having more members  on the board can help in enhancing monitoring capacities on the board.  This, 
however, is offset by the incremental cost of poorer communication as well as inefficient decision making 
resulting from large numbers on board.  The result is consistent with Lakhal (2005), Cheng and Courtenay (2006) 
and Matoussi  and Chakroun (2009)  who found that board size has no effect and is not associated with the level 
of voluntary disclosure.   
With regard to independent directors, it is assumed that  the existence of independent directors on the board 
facilitates a reduction in information asymmetry between owners and managers and eventually  enhances the 
disclosure of information beyond the requirements of accounting regulations.   It also has an impact on 
management decision to disclose information in annual reports.  In this regard,  Yuen et al. (2009) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983) found that companies with a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors will be 
more likely to make more voluntary disclosures. In addition, Zhou and Panbunyuen (2008) found that both 
members of the board (dependent and independent directors) have incentive to disclose information in the annual 
reports. Therefore, hypothesis 1 also suggests that high voluntary disclosure is expected when a company has a 
high percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board.  However, results in Tables 5 and 6 do not 
show a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and the proportion of  independent directors (0.78).  
This result is consistent with Cheng and Courtenay (2006).  An interpretation of  the  result in Bahraini context 
may be that independent directors may not be highly involved in the operations of the business and may lack 
knowledge and experience in financial reporting. 
Hypothesis 2 test:  
It was assumed that separate leadership structure is associated with an increased level of  voluntary disclosure in 
the company's annual reports. Tables 5 and 6 show no significant  correlation exists  between disclosure index 
and duality of  leadership.  So, hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted.  This result is consistent with the results  of  
Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004) who found that  separate leadership structure is not associated with voluntary 
disclosure.  An interpretation for this result may be the  existence of a dominant CEO in the firm where there are 
no clearly defined limits on  the disclosure requirements to the board.   Alternatively, the chairman may be 
ineffective in carrying out his duties and bringing CEO for accountability (see HIH collapse in Australia).   
Hypothesis 3 test: 
The results of  hypothesis three  test (Tables 5 and 6) show that there is no relationship between audit committee 
size  and   independence and the extent of voluntary disclosure. So, the hypothesis that companies with larger  
audit committees and higher number of  independent members on the committee are likely to have higher levels 
of voluntary disclose cannot be supported.   This result is consistent with previous empirical studies.  Nasir and 
Abdullah (2001) and  Abdullah and Nasir (2004) found that audit committee independence is not associated with 
the level of voluntary disclosure.  An explanation for this result is that the code of corporate governance in 
Bahrain recommends the creation of an audit committee.  As such, the existence of an audit committee may not 
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be to pressure the company to disclose more information.  There are certain duties and  responsibilities of  the 
audit committee other than voluntary disclosure.  Companies in Bahrain may create audit committees to provide 
more effective communication between the board of directors and the two check layers, the internal and external 
auditors.  They may also be appointed by the board to fulfill shareholders requirements (Yuen et al., 2009).  In 
addition,  when all audit committee members are independent directors, the committee may not be able to have 
easy access to the accounting records.  Therefore, more members of audit committee will be accompanied with 
more dependent directors. 
Hypothesis 4 test: 
Tables 5 and 6 show that there is no evidence of a relationship between diffused ownership and voluntary 
disclosure.   This result is consistent with the previous literature, indicative of a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure.  Norita and Shamsul Nahar (2004) found that the extent of 
outside block ownership is positively associated with voluntary disclosure.  Similarly, Nasir and Abdullah, 
2001 and Noe, 2002) found that the presence of large outside block holders is significantly associated with 
higher levels of voluntary disclosure.  An interpretation  of this result is that it is based on  the contention that 
large shareholders have  the incentive to monitor management performance and demand more information. The 
argument is  that if an individual has a substantial amount of interest in shares of a company (5% or more) 
he/she will be more interested in the company compared to shareholders who own smaller number of shares 
because dispersed ownership may have less incentive to monitor management (Kim et al. 2007).  Thus,  block 
holders might put pressure on management to disclose all important information.  
 
5. Conclusion, limitations, and further research 
This paper examines the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure of  information and three 
variables: board composition, the existence of an audit committee and ownership structure.  The findings of the 
study reveal that none of the independent variables showed any significant P value on voluntary disclosure.  The 
results are consistent with some previous empirical studies which did not find significant relationship between 
corporate governance variables and disclosure of intellectual capital except for audit committee meetings (Hanifa 
and Cooke, 2002 and  Gan et al., 2008).   However, the results contradict with other studies (e.g., Hossain et al. 
1994 and Chau and Gray, 2002).   In addition, there is no relationship between voluntary disclosure and duality 
of leadership.  Thus, there is no negative impact on information transparency when the chairman and CEO 
responsibilities are concentrated in one person.  This may not be surprising if we consider the contradicting 
results of previous studies such as  Haniffa and Cooke (2002) who found that only non-executive directors have 
significant effect on the extent of voluntary disclosure.  Also, there no relationship between diffused ownership 
and voluntary disclosure.   It can be seen that the findings from Bahrain are similar in some variables and differ 
in other variables.  As such, it can be concluded that corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure 
are poor predictors of voluntary disclosure in Bahraini context and alternative explanations of why companies 
voluntarily disclose information is  needed.   These findings can be good contribution to the literature. 
5.1 Implications 
The findings of the study have implications for both the regulators, policy makers  and corporations.  The study 
provides evidence to regulators in Bahrain to improve corporate governance, enhance the existence and 
independence of audit committees and optimize ownership structure.  The current problems of financial markets 
put governance and audit committees under pressure to understand how financial crises affect their risk profiles.  
Thus, the regulatory agencies should provide some incentives to encourage companies to disclose more 
information.  The study also provides practical implications for corporate governance standards setters.  They 
should consider board composition, audit committees and ownership structure when asserting the optimal design 
of corporate governance mechanisms.  Moreover, corporations should reconsider the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and transparency which lead to sound governance and enhance investors' confidence in financial 
reporting.  This will reflect positively on the marketability of company's shares and reduces capital costs.  In this 
regard, it is worth pointing out that the costs and benefits of  voluntary disclosure vary across firms and may 
outweigh agency costs in many situations (see Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).  Therefore, regardless of agency 
considerations and regulatory guidelines, firms will ultimately formulate their disclosure policy with reference to 
overall marginal costs and marginal benefits  
The implications for current state of  knowledge is that researchers should consider further explanations for the 
voluntary disclosure of  information and the factors that drive companies to disclose.   The results contribute to 
the body of knowledge in that further research is still needed on this issue. The results  can also be used in  
accounting education where voluntary disclosure is related to core values of corporate governance such as 
transparency and accountability.  Finally, the findings of the study have important implications for shareholders 
and other users who have interest in best practices of corporate governance. 
5.2 Limitations 
The findings of this study should be considered in light of the following  limitations. First, the disclosure index 
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does not cover all voluntary disclosure in corporations as employed and supported in previous studies.  It is self-
developed. As such, it  may hinder comparison with the results of other studies.  Voluntary disclosure changes 
across countries, depending on each country mandatory disclosure requirements.  The selection of certain 
disclosure items may also influence the results (Lim et al., 2007).  For example, board composition does not 
affect all types of voluntary disclosure but only the one that represents key decisions like strategy and forward 
looking information, while financial and non-financial data are not related to board composition.   Second, the 
study analyzes one form of voluntary disclosure.  It assumes that all voluntary disclosures are based solely on 
content analysis of the annual reports.  In practice, listed companies may release information in other forms as 
well.  They may release information through private meetings, the press, or interim reports (Yuen et al., 2009).  
This may be improved by conducting interviews or case studies to complement the findings (Gan et al., 2008).   
Third, The sample size may be small but it includes all listed companies in Bahrain (48 firms) and the results can 
be generalized with caution and care.   
5.3 Areas for  further research 
Further research could examine  the association between voluntary disclosure and other corporate governance 
variables and company characteristics such as managerial ownership, government ownership, the proportion of 
shares held by the executive directors and higher ratio of  family members on the board, size of firm, financial 
leverage, nature of business operations, and profitability.  These variables might influence firms  to voluntarily 
disclose information in their annual reports.  In this respect, Huafang and Jianguo (2007) found that managerial 
ownership (i.e., the total number of shares owned by the CEO and executive directors to the total number of 
shares issued), government ownership (i.e., the percentage of shares owned by the public sector to the total 
number of shares issued) are not related to disclosure, but foreign shares ownership is associated with increased 
disclosure.   
In addition to independence of directors, the accounting and financial expertise of members of the board and 
audit committee has also received widespread attention from the media and regulators.  The rules assume that 
members with no experience in accounting or finance are less likely to be able to detect problems in financial 
reporting (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005).   In contrast, given the relatively short time that boards and audit 
committees spend reviewing a company’s financial statements and controls, it is not clear that even members 
with expertise can discover accounting irregularities and may actually be less effective.  Thus, the relationship  
between voluntary disclosure by a firm and financial expertise of  board and audit committees can  be examined.  
Further research could also examine whether board diversity is influenced by factors such as industry, size, 
listing status (firm listing/non-listing and corporate governance) and majority shareholders base (Gray et al., 
2004).   
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